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firm’s potential to provide returns to
shareholders, either in the form of some
future payout (such as dividends or stock
repurchases) or through stock price
appreciation. The faster earnings are
expected to grow, the greater a firm’s
potential ability to compensate share-
holders and the higher its price relative
to its current earnings (that is, the higher
its P/E). 
Historically, the P/E of the S&P500
index has averaged around 14 (see figure
2).3 During late 1998 and much of 1999,
the P/E of the S&P500 index reached
unprecedented levels—indicating that
many believed potential earnings from
ownership of these firms had increased
substantially. As of December 2000, it
had fallen to just below 25.
Apart from optimistic earnings projec-
tions, there are a number of reasons why
investors might have expected P/Es to
rise to higher average levels. First, there is
clear evidence that recent developments
in information technology have sharply
reduced shareholder costs. Adecrease in
shareholder costs allows more earnings to
be passed along as income, and so has the
same effect on P/Es as an increase in
expected future earnings. Figure 3 illus-
trates the substantial decline in the annual
total costs of holding an equity mutual
fund. In an earlier Economic Commen-
tary, we illustrated in some detail how
declining shareholder costs affect stock
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Should the end of the bull market
have come as a surprise?
When we look back at the 1990s, from
the perspective of say 2010....We may
conceivably conclude from that vantage
point that, at the turn of the millennium,
the American economy was experiencing
a once-in-a-century acceleration of
innovation, which propelled forward
productivity, output, corporate profits,
and stock prices at a pace not seen in
generations, if ever. Alternatively, that
2010 retrospective might well conclude
that a good deal of what we are cur-
rently experiencing was just one of the
many euphoric speculative bubbles that
have dotted human history. And, of
course, we cannot rule out that we may
look back and conclude that elements
from both scenarios have been in play 
in recent years.
—Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan
Excerpt from speech given to the 
Economics Club of New York on 
January 13, 2000
The stock market began 2000 the way
it ended the decade of the 1990s, surging
to new record heights (see figure 1).
Because stock markets are by nature for-
ward looking, it appeared as though
investors were convinced that the econ-
omy would play out according to the first
of the alternative scenarios posed by
Chairman Greenspan in the quote cited
above. The sharp acceleration in mea-
sured productivity in the late 1990s, no
doubt, reinforced such optimism. 
Nowhere was optimism more apparent
than in the NASDAQ, which is dominated
by large technology firms, especially those
most likely to prosper from developments
in e-commerce and the Internet. 
In March, however, the mood shifted.
The NASDAQ, which had surged past
5000, began a descent that would leave
it about 50 percent below its peak at
year-end. The S&P500 finished the year
down about 15 percent from its peak and
about 10 percent below where it had
stood at the end of 1999. Despite the
sharp declines over last year, both
indexes remain more than 400 percent
above their 1990 levels.
What can account for such a wild swing,
particularly in the NASDAQ? Was the
rapid run-up and subsequent fall, as
some have claimed, the bursting of a
technology bubble?1 Could one have
known before the slump? This Economic
Commentary addresses these questions.
We begin by reviewing fundamentals
and their implication for price-to-
earnings ratios (P/Es). 
  P/Es and Fundamentals
Stock price listings in the business sec-
tions of most newspapers typically
include both the firm’s closing price and
its P/E. The P/E is simply the ratio of a
firm’s stock price relative to its most
recently reported earnings per share (cur-
rent earnings). P/Es provide a sense of an
investor’s potential income from owning
a stock. For example, consider two stocks
that have the same current earnings and
different expected future earnings but are
otherwise identical.2 Clearly, investors are
willing to pay more for the stock of the
firm that they anticipate will earn more in
the future. In fact, P/Es are often quoted
in terms of a multiple of earnings, for
example, “10 times earnings.”
The role of the path of future earnings in
determining the P/E is straightforward.
The rate of earnings growth determines aprices and expected future returns.4We
showed that seemingly small declines in
shareholder costs can lead to large
increases in stock prices. 
Moreover, such technological improve-
ments mean permanently lower costs 
and potentially higher diversification.
Diversification allows investors to offset
the risks associated with an individual
stock, so-called idiosyncratic risk, by
holding a portfolio of stocks that
respond differently to economic 
phenomena, such as those of an oil-
producing firm and an auto manufac-
turer. Anumber of analyses find that,
together, lower transactions costs and
greater diversification can account for
some of the recent ascent in stock prices
but not all.5 This evidence tends to sup-
port a substantively higher average P/E
if we assume expected earnings growth
to be around its historical trend. 
Another factor that may account for
higher P/Es in recent years is the potential
for credible tax cuts. As the U.S. federal
budget changed from chronic deficit to
growing surplus, the prospect of future
tax cuts became increasingly likely. It is
impossible to know precisely what
impact this expectation might have, but it
seems reasonable that expected tax cuts,
particularly those on capital gains, would
push P/Es marginally higher.
  The S&P500
P/Es over 30 require a quite sanguine
outlook for earnings growth for both the
near and long term. Figure 4 illustrates
why optimism in earnings may not have
seemed outlandish. Earnings in S&P500
companies grew at extraordinary rates
over the last half of the 1990s. More-
over, at the beginning of 2000 analysts
were projecting continued high growth
over the next five years. By the second
half of the year, it became clear that
rapidly rising energy prices were likely
to cut into corporate profits, despite a
notably lower reliance on energy. More-
over, a decline in consumer confidence,
coupled with a severely cold December,
led companies to revise their reported
earnings down sharply, which further
damped earnings prospects. 
In retrospect, the decline in the S&P500
largely reflects a number of events that
affected key fundamentals. On the basis
of the S&P500’s performance in 2000,
investors apparently got ahead of 
themselves. With a P/E currently around
25, the S&P500 still embodies a fair
degree of optimism, but arguably not an
unreasonable amount.6 The NASDAQ,
on the other hand, tells a different story.
  The NASDAQ 
The NASDAQ, like the S&P500, is a
value-weighted index. This means that
price movements in firms with large 
capitalizations can dominate index
movements. In recent years many of the
largest NASDAQ companies have been
technology firms. Because of this, 
NASDAQ movements have largely 
been associated with developments in
the technology sector. Indeed, the huge
swing in the index during 2000 largely
reflected the pattern of some of the
largest technology stocks. So to better
understand the rise of the NASDAQ’s
level and its subsequent decline, it is
instructive to consider the P/Es of the
largest firms in the technology sector.
Atelling analysis of large-cap technology
stocks appeared in an article by Jeremy
Siegel in The Wall Street Journal near the
market peak last March.7 Siegel focused
on the 33 largest firms based on market
capitalization—those with values greater
than $85 billion. Of these, 18 were tech-
nology stocks. Siegel noted that their
market-weighted P/E equaled 125.9 on
March 7, 2000. What’s more, he notes,
half of the large-cap technology stocks
had P/Es over 100. For these stocks, the
market-weighted P/E was 208.2. 
Siegel then contrasts such P/Es with pro-
jected earnings growth rates from
I/B/E/S International and historical
experience. He finds that once a firm
reaches large-cap status—ranked in the
top 50 by market value—its ability to
generate long-term, double-digit earn-
ings growth slows dramatically. More-
over, he finds no example of a large-cap
firm to ever justify, by its subsequent
record, a P/E anywhere near 100. He
concludes that the market for technology
stocks has been driven to an extreme not
consistent with historical experience.
Siegel does not deny that the excitement
generated by the technology and com-
munications revolution is fully justified.
Rather, he emphasizes that this does not
automatically translate into market
value. His analysis does not preclude
that in 2010, we may indeed look back
on these times as an unprecedented
period of prosperity. Siegel’s point is
simply that even if we are witnessing a
substantial revolution, it is not clear that
firms can continue to earn returns so far
in excess of historical averages.
In the months that followed the market
peak, it became clear that large-cap 
technology stocks were priced with no
margin for error. That is, even if one
believed that the technology sector of the
economy had entered a regime that sup-
ports permanently higher stock prices
and P/E ratios, it was further necessary to
accept that these particular stocks could
generate earnings growth at a faster pace
and for a longer duration than any large-
cap firm in history, in order to justify
their valuations.
We conclude that the rise and fall of
large-cap technology stock valuations—
and their consequent impact on the 
NASDAQ—is compelling evidence of a
bubble that was destined to burst. As
Siegel’s analysis demonstrates, one
could rationally conclude prior to the
peak that these valuations were vulnera-
ble to any signs of near-term weakness.8
Fortunately, the euphoria was contained.
The imprint of the bubble on the S&P
500, though significant, was muted.
After taking account of the 15 percent
decline off its peak, one is reminded that
the S&P500 remains 400 percent above
its 1990 level.
  Concluding Thoughts 
When looking back on 2000 from
today’s vantage, the recent exuberance
in the technology-sector stocks was not
validated by the economic news that
unfolded over the balance of the year.
Dampened consumer spending and the
inevitable deceleration in computers and
software investment that followed Y2K-
related refurbishing and upgrading
seemed to be less-than-fully anticipated.
These events were enough to induce
investors to adopt a more cautious per-
spective on profit growth.
This sharp decline in technology stocks
should not be taken to mean that innova-
tions in technology will fail to propel pro-
ductivity and corporate profits forward to
a pace not seen in generations. However,
it is not just the prospect for growth that
matters. Growth, if it occurs, must also
generate sufficient profits to adequately
recompense equity owners. Vast profit
potential creates huge incentives for more
entrants into new and lucrative markets,
and competition tends to reduce the profit
margins of individual firms.
We want to emphasize that the current
vantage reveals very little about what
one might expect to conclude in 2010.
However, we suspect it probable thatelements of both the Chairman’s pro-
posed scenarios were in play. The econ-
omy appears to have entered a period
of sustained productivity growth, but
one cannot know the extent to which it
will persist. Stock valuations will hinge
on investor confidence that strong pro-
ductivity will continue. As we’ve seen,
this confidence can swing wildly.
FIGURE 1 STOCK MARKET INDEXES
SOURCE:  The Wall Street Journal.
NOTE:  The S&P 500 was developed with a base level of 10 for the 1941–43
period. The NASDAQ is indexed to 100 on February 5, 1971.
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SOURCE:  Standard and Poor’s Corporation.
SOURCE:  Standard and Poor’s Corporation.
  Footnotes
1. Here, we loosely define a bubble as
the rapid increase of an asset’s price
such that the current value of the
stream of expected future income is so
high that there is little probability of
making a profit given that valuation.
Oftentimes, bubbles begin when
legitimate profit possibilities cause
prices to rise. Prices are then driven
past valuations justified by economic
fundamentals, as speculators attempt to
profit solely by trading the asset.
2. In terms of risk, dividend-payout ratio,
tax treatment, and so on.
3. Calculation is based on monthly data
from 1871–99, which are featured in
Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance,
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
2000. These data are also available online
at <http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/>.4. See John B. Carlson and Eduard A.
Pelz, “Investor Expectations and 
Fundamentals: Disappointment Ahead?”
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
Economic Commentary, May 1, 2000.
5. See, for example, Jeremy J. Siegel,
“The Shrinking Equity Premium,” 
Journal of Portfolio Management, vol.
26, no. 1 (fall 1999), pp. 10–17; John
Heaton and Deborah Lucas, “Stock
Prices and Fundamentals,” NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, vol. 14, 1999,
pp. 213–42, and Robert J. Shiller,
Irrational Exuberance, Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2000.
6. For a more detailed analysis of how
plausible combinations of increases in
expected earnings (dividend) growth and
declines in the required rate of return
(discount rate) can account for recent
increases in the P/E ratio, see Nathan S.
Balke and Mark E. Wohar, “Why Are
Stock Prices So High: Dividend Growth
or Discount Factor?” Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, Working Paper no. 
00-01, January 2000.
7. See Jeremy J. Siegel, “Big-Cap Stocks
Are a Sucker Bet,” The Wall Street 
Journal, March 13, 2000, p. A30.
8. We have not considered the traded
prices of Internet startups, that is, the
infamous dot-coms. There seems to be
little dispute that their market values
could not be justified on the basis of
fundamentals.
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